Political polarization and its consequences on democratic accountability by Körösényi, András
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2013) 
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY Vol.4 (2013) 2, 3–30
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AbstrAct This paper first explores the polarization thesis, according to which 
between 1990-2010 political polarization increased to a large extent in the 
Hungarian political elite and among citizens, although it did not undermine the 
stability of the political system. Second, it gives an endogenous explanation for 
this phenomenon. Third, through theoretical discussion and empirical examples 
taken from Hungarian politics it is revealed that although growing polarization 
has not generated regime instability, it reduces, or might reduce, the efficiency 
of the operation of democracy. Five mechanisms of the effects of ideological 
polarization which weaken democratic accountability are explored.
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Joseph Schumpeter, the founder of the elitist theory of democracy, defined 
democracy as follows:
“... the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote.” (1987: 269)
It is less well known that Schumpeter argued that the proper functioning of 
democracy defined this way depends on several preconditions. One of these 
is democratic restraint, according to which democratic governance can only 
be succesful if all participants accept the structural principles of society. That 
is, the success of democracy demands consensus around these principles. 
According to Schumpeter:
1  Institute for Political Science, Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
1014 Budapest, Országház utca 30. korosenyi.andras@tk.mta.hu
4 ANDRÁS KÖRÖSÉNYI
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2013) 
“Whenever these principles are called into question and issues 
arise that rend a nation into two hostile camps, democracy 
works at a disadvantage.” (Emphasis added.) (1987:296)
The Schumpeterian tradition in political science taken in a narrow sense 
has diverged, but both main schools have taken seriously the question of 
consensus/dissensus. One school is the competitive theory of democracy 
which requires consensus among voters. According to the economic model 
of democratic competition put forward by Anthony Downs at the end of the 
1950s in his book An Economic Theory of Democracy, if the preferences 
of the voters follow a normal distribution on a left-right scale, competing 
political parties will approach the centre.2 Whichever party wins the election, 
the centripetal tendency caused by the competition will result in consensus-
based public policy. However, if the distribution of voter preferences is 
U-shaped, fewest voters will be found in the centre and the number of voters 
will increase towards the end of the scale and parties will manouvre towards 
the extreme left and right, producing a centrifugal trend. According to Downs, 
in a situtation like this, whoever wins the elections the result could be civil 
war.
The other main school is the political sociological theory of democratic 
elitism. In the new elite paradigm worked out by John Higley and his 
collaborators in the 1980s, attention was directed from competition to the 
social and political preconditions of the stability of liberal democracies (Field 
and Higley 1980; Higley and Burton 2006; Best and Higley 2010). Instead of 
competing political leaders, Higley and his colleagues focused on political 
elite groups and their relationships in a broader sense. They showed that the 
basis of the stability of a democratic regime is the forming of an underlying 
consensus among elites rather than among voters. While this consensus 
might not extend to values, it covers the norms which concern the operation 
of democratic institutions. If this consensus is not formed, or unravels, the 
stability of democracy is imperiled.
Higley and his colleagues reached their conclusions based on socio-
historical and comparative elite research. Through empirical studies they 
looked for historical ways and elite constellations that led to the establishment 
of stable liberal democracies. They found two predominant ways this could 
occur: negotiated elite settlement and gradually forming elite convergence. 
They also found that elite disunity leads to destabilization.
Following the democratic transitions of East-Central Europe between 1989-
2  For this correlation to be true, it requires two competing parties, and their being rational and 
office-oriented as preconditions in Downs’ (1957) model.
5POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2013) 
92 they broadened their research to include the region. The result was that 
the negotiated-agreement-based mode of transition witnessed there – which 
includes roundtable negotiations – fulfilled the criteria of elite settlement. 
According to the authors, this produced an elite consensus that stabilized the 
emerging liberal democracies (Higley-Burton 2006: 84-88; Higley-Lengyel 
2000: 14-15).3 This finding corresponded to the understanding formed in the 
transitology literature of the 1990s which viewed the Polish and Hungarian 
roundtable negotiations as the celebrated means of democratic transition.
However, in the decade after the turn of the millennium more and more 
political observers and analysts indicated growing polarization in Polish and 
Hungarian politics. In sociology and political science many started to question 
the thesis of Higley and his colleagues; namely, that a negotiated transition 
inevitably leads to enduring elite consensus and political stability. Among 
Hungarian elite researchers, Gabriella Ilonszki and György Lengyel think that 
an ever-more confrontative style of politics and a permanent violation of norms 
on the part of the political elite in the decade after the turn of the millennium 
have turned Hungary into a “simulated democracy”4 (Ilonszki and Lengyel 
2010). Based on the political developments of the past decade they hold that 
the agreements of 1989-90 produced not a durable elite consensus, but only 
a temporary compromise.5 Jacek Wasilewski (2010), meanwhile, reaches 
the conclusion by analyzing Polish politics that the consensus underlying 
democratic elitism unraveled after the turn of the millennium. Thomas Baylis 
(2012) in his comparative analysis of Central European countries points to 
the Hungarian and the Polish examples, where the establishment of an elite 
consensus was questionable from the beginning.
3  Higley and his co-authors categorized the German, Czech and Slovak mode of democratic 
transition as ‘elite convergence’.
4  “Simulated democracy”: when elite and significant groups of society “only imitate acceptance 
of the rules of the game” (Ilonszki-Lengyel 2009:9).
5  In my understanding, Higley and his coauthors (2002, 8) overemphasized the existence of elite 
unity among the political elite groups which took part in the negotiations, in the political as 
well as sociological sense. Though negotiated regime change created the rules and guaranteed 
the peaceful nature of the transition, no full consensus among the political elite was formed 
regarding either the constitutional framework to be established or public policy objectives to be 
followed. There was a chance for the constitution to become consolidated, and developments in 
the decade after the failure to craft a new constitution in 1995-97 pointed in this direction. But 
this trend ceased in the fall of 2006 (Körösényi 2007).
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In the following, I will focus on the problem of political polarization, while 
narrowing my analysis to Hungarian politics and some theoretical questions.6 
First, I will ask an empirical-descriptive question: Is Hungarian politics really 
polarized, and if so, to what extent? We shall see that Hungarian politics has 
been characterized, both on the level of voters and of the elite, by significant 
and growing polarization (the thesis of polarization). Second, I look for an 
explanation for the extent of polarization. We see that polarization can be 
explained by the emanation or ‘ripple’ effect of increasing antagonism among 
the political elite to wider society (the thesis of endogeneity). Third, I will 
try to test the Schumpeterian thesis that answers the question what effect 
polarization has (had) on the stability of the political system and the functioning 
of democracy, or, to put it another way, on democratic accountability (the 
Schumpeterian thesis).
tHe Polarization oF HunGarian Politics
So, first about the extent of the polarization of Hungarian politics, and the 
political elite. Has political polarization increased in the two decades since 
regime change? Political commentators and analysts have registered many 
symptoms of political polarization and have provided much anecdotal evidence 
to support this contention (e.g. Palonen 2009). The experience of ordinary 
citizens supports the researchers’ observations. What deserves our attention is 
that the results of empirical studies correspond to the judgement of analysts. 
The results show, first, that the proportion of ideological self-identification 
has increased, and second, that the measure of political polarization was high 
and constantly increased in the examined period.
But before we proceed to an examination of polarization, we should ask a 
preliminary question. What concepts should be adopted in Hungarian politics 
for examining political-ideological (self-)identification? It has been the 
unequivocal result of two decades of research in this area that in Hungary the 
concepts of left and right serve as the most widely accepted political-ideological 
compass, coming before, for example, the labels conservative/liberal. 75-85 
percent of respondents can identify their place using this left/right distinction 
and the proportion of those identifying themselves as being on the left or right 
6  Debate and conflict are fundamental to politics; their intensity increases participation, as well 
as the stakes of political contestation. Covering up political conflicts has many disadvantages. 
In this paper I intend to highlight what the effects of “too intense” conflict and extreme 
polarization might be.
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increased in the period between 1999-2004 (Fábián 2005: 219-232). So I will 
consider the positions of voters, representatives, parties and elite groups on a 
left-right axis to be a basic measure of political-ideological polarization. An 
important indicator in this regard is the self-placement of voters on a left-right 
scale. Research done by Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos in the past two 
decades (2000: 111; 2011: 357) shows that the distribution of voters’ positions 
on a left-right scale (based on self-definition), having started from a normal 
distribution has become more polarized (see Figure 1 and Table 1). These 
results correspond to the results of other researchers, such as Zoltán Fábián 
(2005: 219), and also Zsolt Enyedi and Keneth Benoit (see Enyedi-Benoit 
2011: 25). Growing polarization has occurred in parallel with an increase in 
partisanship as well (Tóka 2005:  27-33).
Figure 1 Distribution of voters’ positions on a left-right scale based on voters’ self-
placement (1994, 2003 and 2010)
Source: After Angelusz-Tardos (2011:  357-370).
Figure 1 shows that in the middle of the 1990s the distribution of voters’ 
self-placement on the left-right scale follows a classic bell curve, which has 
a sharp spike in the middle and almost completely flattens out towards the 
edges. In the next fifteen years (between 1994 and 2010) political realignment 
takes place, gradually weakening the centre and causing the bell-shape to 
flatten in the middle and thicken at the edges.
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7 Depending on the calibration of the scale and the method of calculation different studies use 
different, non-comparable indices. Resultingly, the indexes presented in this paper are not 
directly comparable. 
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The extent of polarization is measured by researchers using a polarization 
index (PI), which is the quotient of those at the ends of the scale and those in 
the middle.7 According to research by Angelusz and Tardos (2011: 357), the 
polarization index calculated this way based on the self-placement of citizens 
on a 10-degree left-right scale gradually increased from a value of 0.31 to 
1.64 between 1994 and 2010 (see Table 1).8
Table 1 Polarization (poles/centre) index based on the self-placement
of voters on a left-right scale (1994, 1998, 2003, 2009 and 2010) 
Survey year
1994. 
April
1998. 
February-
March
2003. 
November
2009. 
April-June
2010. 
March
PI index 0,31 0,39 0,93 1,61 1,64
Source: Angelusz-Tardos 2011:  357-370.
The international comparative studies of the European Social Survey 
have measured citizens’ ideological self-identification on an 11-degree left-
right scale every two years since 2002. Based on the data in the surveys, a 
polarization index can be calculated.9 The number of participating countries 
somewhat varies survey by survey but Hungarian politics was determined to 
be one of the more polarized throughout the period examined.10 Hungary was 
the sixth of 22 countries in 2002, the seventh of 25 in 2004, the third of 23 
in 2006, the tenth of 29 in 2008, and the fourth of 19 in 2010 in terms of the 
highest level of polarization. If we compare results by groups of countries, 
Hungary’s PI is around the average of the new democracies, but always 
significantly higher than the average of the EU-15.
7  Depending on the calibration of the scale and the method of calculation different studies use 
different, non-comparable indices. Resultingly, the indexes presented in this paper are not 
directly comparable.
8  Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos (2005: 73) calculated the polarization index using a 
10-degree scale and divided the sum of the two extreme left (1-2) and the two extreme right 
(9-10) self-placements by the sum of the two middle (5-6) placements.  Other studies indicate 
a similar trend. If we calculate the same index based on the research of Zoltán Fábián (2005: 
231), we get a similar result, rising from a value of 0.175 in 1990 to 0.88 in 2003.
9  Calculation of the PI was done by using an 11-degree left-right scale and by dividing the sum 
of the 0-1 and the 9-10 self-placements by the number of the 5 placements.
10  The Hungarian polarization index fluctuates at a relatively high level, and it always rises in 
election years.
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Figure 2 Polarization indexes in Hungary and different groups of EU countries 
(2002-2010)
Source: European Social Survey (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/)
The extent of political polarization in Hungary is especially high – according 
to research by Gábor Tóka (2006: 23-24) – considering that the number 
of effective parties is relatively low. There is usually positive correlation 
between the number of effective parties and political polarization; however, 
in Hungary polarization has been even higher than could be expected based 
on the number of parties.11
So, in Hungary between 1998 and 2010, while the number of effective parties 
decreased (Enyedi-Benoit 2011: 21), the political-ideological polarization as 
measured on a left-right scale increased, and two large opposing political 
blocs were formed (Soós 2012). There are three further developments that 
signal the appearance and growth of political polarization.
11  It can be added that other indicators also indicate constant growth in political polarization: the 
distance between the voters of governing and opposition parties (Angelusz and Tardos 2005: 
78) and the distance between the dominant parties (Fábián 2005: 219; Bíró 2011; Enyedi and 
Benoit 2011: 25-26)  have been constantly growing. Party identification has been gradually 
increasing in Hungary as well, and since the turn of the millennium the number of voters 
identifying with a party has been higher than the average of European countries (Tóka 2006: 
25-26). 
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The first one is that, beginning at the end of the 1990s, the instability of 
party preferences began to quickly decrease.12 By 1998, voters’ “bloc-loyalty” 
was established, and by 2002, their party-loyalty as well. The volatility index 
between parties, and between left and right, which had been extremely high 
in the 1990s, significantly dropped after 1998 (see Table 2). Crossing over 
between political camps virtually ceased by 2002 and 2006. “The election 
results of 2002 and 2006 (...) basically show the opposition of two large and 
immovable voting blocs” (Gergely Karácsony, summarizing his research on 
the stabilization of party preferences (2006: 64)). 
The second development is that, according to research by Róbert Tardos 
and Zsófia Papp (2012), in the decade after the turn of the millennium the 
portion of strongly committed partisan voters increased among voters of 
MSZP and Fidesz as well, which indicates a crystallizing of voting blocs and 
a polarization of voter behaviour.
Table 2 Indexes of volatility (1994-2006)
1994 1998 2002 2006 2010
Aggregate volatility 25,8 31,7 18,3 9,0 35
Volatility between blocs n.a. 16,0 7,2 2,1 n.a.
Volatility of votes for the governing parties -25,8 -12,2 -3,6 2,1 n.a.
Source: for the 1994-2006 period, Karácsony 2006, 66; for 2010, Enyedi-Benoit 2011, 20.
The third development is that the decrease in crossing over between political 
camps shows up not only in voting behaviour but in everyday relationships 
as well. As we know from research by Róbert Angelusz and Róbert Tardos 
(2011: 358-365), since the turn of the millennium membership of a political 
camp has affected citizens’ networks of personal relationships. In strongly 
attached, close relationships of individuals a tendency to political homophily 
has prevailed and has gradually strengthened, according to research results 
from 2003 and 2009. Personal circles of acquaintances and networks of 
relationships have become politically more homogenous. The same  research 
also shows that this relationship homophilia is more pronounced at the 
ideological poles than it is in the middle, and that it increases with intensity of 
political interest (Angelusz-Tardos 2011: 362-365).
It has to be noted, however, that the 2010 elections were a turning point 
in many respects. The elections produced a dramatic increase in volatility, 
12  In Western Europe for the same period average volatility slightly dropped, while in Eastern 
Europe it slightly rose (Schmitt-Scheurer 2011: 318).
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disintegrated the two-block system (Soós 2012), and produced a new party-
system.13 After 2010 the opposition of the incumbent centre-right coalition 
divided into a few splinter groups and parties on the left and a radical 
opposition on the right (Jobbik). This development might have an impact on 
patterns of  ideological polarization in the future. However, to analye the post-
2010 period is not the goal of this article.
tHe elite
It is not only voter behaviour and perception that have become so 
ideologically polarized. In the past two decades several studies have focused 
on the political and ideological belief systems of various segments of the elite, 
including their placement on the left-right scale.
We know the self-placement of the elites of each party on an 11-degree 
scale from the findings of the elite survey conducted by the Election 
Research Program at the time of the 2010 elections among candidates for 
Parliament.14 According to these results, candidates’ self-definitions do not 
differ significantly from the self-definitions given by voters from the same 
party, measured in the same survey. Both show strong polarization. MSZP 
has a position of 1.6 on the scale both among its voters and the elite, while 
Fidesz occupies a position of 7.4 among the elite, and 7.8 among its voters 
–  the distance between the voters is slightly more than the distance between 
the candidates (Enyedi-Benoit 2011: 37).
According to Hungarian data from the INTUNE international elite survey 
of representatives, the polarization index calculated on the basis of self-
placement on an 11-degree left-right scale was 1.38 in 2008, and 1.86 in 
2009.15 The PI value calculated from the results of the 2010 elite survey 
conducted by the Election Research Program among members of Parliament 
was 2.86, which shows more extreme polarization among representatives.
An elite survey conducted in the Institute of Political Science of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences (Csurgó-Megyesi 2011: 152) which 
included a much wider circle of the political elite than just candidates and 
13  The 2009 elections for the European Parliament already signalled this change in voter 
behaviour. As a consequence of this change the support for the left-liberal block collapsed in 
the 2010 landslide parliamentary elections.
14 http://www.valasztaskutatas.hu/eredmenyek-en/adatbazisok
15 http://www.intune.it/ The calculation method for the PI: the sum of the 0-1 and 9-10 self-
placements divided by the 5 placements.
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representatives also examined the ideological polarization of the elite (on a 
9-degree scale). As can be seen in Figure 3, even in this very wide sample, 
which included public servants, local government officials, church and union 
leaders, as well as leaders of sports and other social organizations, significant 
polarization has occured. The inclusiveness of this 401 person sample is 
indicated by the fact that in 2009 members of the Parliament accounted 
only for 6.7 percent of the sample and leading party officials for 1.7 percent 
(Csurgó-Megyesi 2011: 152).
These results confirm the findings of the previous studies that the ideological 
polarization of the Hungarian political-public elite significantly increased in 
the decade after the turn of the millennium (Girst-Keil 2011: 317), a fact 
which is illustrated in Figure 3. The polarization index measured here also 
increased significantly, from a value of 0.62 in 2001 to 1.25 in 2009.16 But 
this does not simply reflect a case of the extremes becoming stronger and the 
centre becoming weaker. Self-placement decreased in all three positions in or 
near the centre and increased in all three positions on the left and right. This 
means that the centrifugal tendency affected the whole left-right scale; the 
whole of the bell-curve became flatter.
Growing elite disunity, according to the new elite paradigm, may destabilize 
liberal democratic regimes. But in Hungary, no clear evidence supports this 
thesis. Either disunity is not so sharp (as unity is required by the new elite 
paradigm) or it does not produce the assumed consequence of instability. 
Having seen the figures about polarization, let us now turn to the problem 
of regime instability. Although political protest and direct participation in 
demonstrations have increased since the autumn of 2006, these endeavours 
were channelled and institutionalized by constitutionally-defined procedures 
like public initiatives and referendums (2008), the foundation of new political 
parties (Jobbik) and were expressed through changing voting behaviour at the 
2010 general elections. The latter brought a landslide victory for the moderate 
Right Fidesz-MPP. The two-thirds parliamentary majority made it possible 
for Fidesz-MPP and its parliamentary ally to introduce a new constitution on 
1st January, 2012, but one which fits with constitutional procedures and has 
not brought a radical change in the nature of the system of government. To 
sum up, a peaceful seizure of power has not been challenged by any means 
in Hungary. Growing political polarization has instead caused a realignment 
of electoral behaviour, a radical change in the party system and produced a 
landslide victory for one of the competing political blocks.
16  The PI was calculated by dividing the sum of the 1-2 positions and the 8-9 positions by the 
5 positions.
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Figure 3 Self-placement of the political elite on a 9-degree scale, as a percentage of 
all surveyed, and the polarization index (PI) (2001 and 2009)  (1 = left; 9 = right) 
Source: Elite survey by the Institute of Political Science of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. 
The PI values are based on the author’s own calculations.
To summarize the first part of this article we can conclude that in Hungarian 
politics between 1990 and 2010 growing political polarization took place in 
the left-right dimension, and in the five years before the 2010 elections it 
became extreme. This polarization occured with voters as well as the political 
elite.
eXPlanations For Polarization
Political scientists and analysts considered the ideologization and 
polarization of Hungarian politics to be extensive, or even excessive, even 
in the 1990s. How can we explain the strong polarization of Hungarian 
politics that can be observed subsequent to the democratic transition? In my 
opinion the following factors have undoubtedly contributed to the process of 
polarization.
The first explanatory factor is the heavy role of ideology, which has 
affected Hungarian politics in several ways. First, the fast pluralization of 
the political spectrum in 1989-90 and the accompanying task of political 
mobilization created a structural necessity. For the newly-established 
political parties (lacking predecessors and traditions), in order to succeed in 
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terms of political mobilization, it was imperative to differentiate themselves 
as clearly as possible from their rivals, which led them to emphasize 
ideological differences. Second, ideology-producing intellectuals, especially 
by international comparison, played an unusually prominent role, which, 
though varying in intensity, remained constant throughout the period.17 Third, 
the prominent presence of ideology-oriented politicians, who, in contrast to 
their office-oriented, pragmatic peers  –  who take the political preferences of 
voters as a given  –  wish not only to follow, but to shape citizens’ preferences. 
The mobilization function of political parties, the ideology-producing role 
of intellectuals and the presence of ideology-oriented politicians reinforced 
competitive elite-strategies in the 1990s, which later became a permanent 
feature of Hungarian politics.
The second explanatory factor can be found in the subcultural elements 
which acted to strengthen the internal cohesion of rival elite groups and the 
backgrounds of parties. These subcultural groups are bound together by 
(besides common socio-cultural factors and clientele-interests) looser or 
stricter ideological components as well. Political subcultures had already 
played a role in politics and party formation of the end of the 1980s. But now 
I would like to focus on the party strategies that could be observed from the 
middle of the 1990s and which continued after the turn of the millennium. 
Through these strategies the parties consciously tried to bind pre-existing 
civil groups and organizations (e.g. ethnic, veteran, legacy organizations, 
associations, churches, foundations and think tanks) to themselves, or 
to create organizations or movements often labeled “independent” or 
“nonpartisan”, and thus strengthen their social, cultural, intellectual and 
economic background (Csizmadia 2003; Enyedi 1996). The parties and the 
leaders of the political camps offered symbolic and ideological signs  and 
political narratives to the members and sympathizers of these organizations, 
civil groups and movements and by this created/maintained the political 
camps and subculture.
Third, I consider the appearance of political populism in national 
politics and among big parties to be an independent factor in the growth of 
polarization. Economic populism in a wider sense has been present and used 
since the 1990s until today by parliamentary parties  –  both on the left and 
the right, in government and opposition  –  to win over Hungarian voters 
who exhibit predominantly leftist attitudes in economic and social policy 
(e.g. the program of “welfare regime change”, the promise of 13th and 14th 
17  Beside a broad body of literature on the topic there alsois exists empirical research on the 
political character of public intellectuals (Kristóf 2005; 2011).
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month pensions, etc.). Political populism and anti-elite sentiment was also 
present in Hungarian politics in the 1990s, but it was limited to marginal 
groups, or parties that were small or played only a temporary role in national 
politics (e.g. the Smallholders’ Party, or MIÉP). This situation changed after 
the turn of the millennium with anti-establisment political populism making 
an appearance in mainstream parties and the political elite. After losing the 
2002 elections the leader of the political right, Viktor Orbán, performed an 
explicit – in the narrower, political sense – populist  turn. He organized an 
extra-parliamentary, “above parties” movement by founding so-called “Civil 
Circles” and began to use anti-establishment rhetoric targeted at former 
Communist functionaries who had become wealthy entrepreneurs during the 
process of privatization, international financial institutions and multinational 
corporations. This populism was not limited to political rhetoric but appeared 
in the party’s opposition strategy (e.g. the forcing through of the 2008 “social 
referendum”), and after the election victory of 2010 in government policy 
as well. According to Higley’s paradigm, this division of the elite and the 
emergence of strategies aimed at division means, by definition, the opposite 
of elite-consensus, or its weakness.
The fourth – and, in my opinion, decisive – factor in the development of the 
polarization spiral is the contribution of political leaders. The important role 
that political leaders have played in the formation of political preferences in 
Hungary is supported not just by the work of political analysts and political 
theorists but by empirical studies as well. Several authors have emphasized 
the outstanding role and effect of political leaders in Hungarian politics. 
Körösényi (2001) analyzed the strengthening of the role of the prime minister, 
using Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb’s concept of presidentialization. 
Enyedi (2005) explained the reformation of the party system through the 
strategic decisions made by the leader(s) of Fidesz. Tóka (2006) pointed to the 
personalization of electoral competition and the unusual extent of voter leader-
centric attitudes, while Ilonszki and Lengyel (2010), using James MacGregor 
Burns’ typology, wrote about the preponderance of the transformative style 
of leadership. These results also mean that the polarization of citizens’ 
preferences on a left-right scale is not simply something given (exogenously) 
to parties, but is the result of the strategies of the parties and their leaders; that 
is, it is an endogenous factor.18 Personal elements and the dominant style and 
18  The role of exogenous factors cannot be denied, however. Parties at least in part build on 
exisiting attitudes and socio-psychological characteristics. One such factor is the growing 
dissatisfaction with the new system – democracy and the capitalist market economy – 
which arose after the regime change and was caused by economic contraction, growing 
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character of political leadership over the past decade have also significantly 
contributed to polarization. The rivalry of the two opposing political leaders 
(Viktor Orbán and Ferenc Gyurcsány) with their confrontative styles, constant 
raising of the stakes and readiness to take risks resulted in the strengthening 
of political polarization.19
Fifth, and last, I would like to mention a factor which questions the 
applicability of Higley’s elite-consensus paradigm to the Hungarian transition 
at its starting point. This is the lack or weakness of an underlying consensus. 
According to this explanation, Hungarian politics is characterized not simply 
by strong political-ideological polarization but from the very beginning has 
lacked the underlying consensus necessary for the efficient functioning of 
democracy, which, in Higley’s approach, is the basis of elite-consensus. 
According to this view it is a mistake to regard the agreement of the Hungarian 
transition as consensual: in 1989-1990 only a temporary compromise was 
struck.20 The notion of a lack of an underlying consensus is supported by the 
delegitimizing strategy of the parties. As part of an underlying consensus, the 
competing parties should recognize the legitimacy of one another. Contrary to 
this, the Hungarian right has called into question the national commitment of 
the left and the left the democratic commitment of the right, from the beginning 
of the 1990s  until current times. The lack of an underlying consensus also 
explains why, instead of debates about public policy, the focus of Hungarian 
politics has consisted of symbolic (legitimizing and exclusionary) discourses. 
The delegitimizing strategies of the parties strengthen the intensity of the left-
unemployment and other economic difficulties which had been on the rise since the 
beginning-middle of the 1990s, and the alarming loss of trust in political institutions (parties, 
Parliament, the government) (Boda–Medve-Bálint 2010). All this does not lead to political-
ideological polarization by itself though. Nor do institutional factors (first and foremost the 
electoral system), which are often cited as an explanation for the drop in the effective number 
of parties. The decrease in party numbers and the bipolarity of the party system, however, do 
not explain polarization, a fact which Sartori (1976) reached (arriving at precisely the opposite 
conclusion) in his theory of party systems. The main thesis of my paper is that the cause of 
the ideological polarization of Hungarian politics is endogenous, meaning it relates to the 
strategies and actions of political actors.
19  According to some analysts the rivalry between the two political leaders can be described as a 
game of chicken, as known from game theory (Gergely 2006). I think a similarly enlightening 
model is the dollar-auction game where the rivals’ commitment to an earlier chosen strategy 
which threatens to end in failure escalates because of the need to justify their earlier investment. 
What adds interest to this problem of “entrapment” from the viewpoint of this paper is that, 
according to psychological experiments, a bigger stake and more responsibility increases the 
measure of entrapment, in contrast to what intuition would say (Plous 1993: 248-251).
20  This compromise only worked for a while: the political unity of the opposition and negotiations 
with the Communists unraveled by the fall of 1989.
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right opposition and ideological-political polarization.21 Polarization, from 
the middle of the decade until after the turn of the millennium, has weakened 
the basic values and institutions of the political system.
tHe cHicken-eGG Problem
In my view, the above factors have all contributed to the strong polarization 
of Hungarian politics. However, I haven’t explicitly addressed the question 
yet of which came first – polarization of voters’ preferences, or the political 
leaders’ strategy of polarizing the voters? Is there a causal relationship 
between voter polarization and elite polarization? If there is, what is it? Or 
are both explained by other factors? Do vote-maximizing parties follow the 
‘flattening out’ process indicated by the preference-distribution of voters, or, 
quite the reverse: does a centrifugal trend cause polarization as a result of the 
parties’ strategies?
In political theory the tradition associated with the names of Weber, 
Schumpeter, Sartori and Riker, highlights the active role of political parties, 
leaders and the elite in forming the political preferences of voters (Körösényi 
2010; Pakulski-Körösényi 2012). In the paradigm of heresthetics the nature 
and intensity of political-ideological conflicts is the consequence, first 
and foremost, of party/elite strategies. One (smaller) branch of political 
sociology and the literature of cleavages, following Rokkan, emphasizes that 
the sociological division of society is not necessarily a politically relevant 
division, the latter being constituted by the actions of political actors (Sartori 
1969; Enyedi 2005). This is confirmed by a part of the literature on the 
relationship between voters and parties. According to empirical research 
conducted in the United States which examined political communication, 
parties and public opinion, political polarization is a top-down phenomenon 
and the elite orientate the voters (Fiorina et al 2008; Levendusky 2010; Zaller 
1992).22 The once-again increasing role of parties since the 1980s, as well as 
21  The underlying consensus was quite weak even from 1990 onwards (Körösényi 2007), but 
it was openly questioned after the fall of 2006. There were many signs of this: the protest 
movement of the fall of 2006, police violence, the opposition’s boycotting of the prime 
minister’s speeches in Parliament, the questioning of the legitimacy of the government and 
even of the Constitution, by the opposition and extra-parliamentary groups, the opposing 
views of the constitutionality of the 2008 referendum and the conflict over the passing of the 
new Constitution in 2010-11.
22  However, others write about the parallel spread of ideological polarization among voters and 
the elite at the same time (e.g. Abramowitz and Saunders 2008).
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the increasing partisanship of voters, are both consequences of ideological 
polarization among the parties and the political elite (King 1997; Layman és 
Carsey 2002; Hetherington 2011).
The role of the elites is even more pronounced in post-communist countries 
than in countries where there was a continuity of democracy. With the 
pluralization of politics, the political division and ideological identification 
of the elite occured much more quickly than that of wider society. The new 
parties which determined the development of politics in Hungary were based 
on narrow groups of the intellectual elite. They had a definite ideological 
character from the beginning. According to the assessments of analysts and 
political scientists, political conflicts  –  when compared to contemporary 
Western European politics  – focused on ideological questions to an unusually 
high degree (Ágh 1993); that is, ideology played a significant role in the 
creation of political camps.
From Hungarian studies of the elite(s) and citizens over the past two 
decades, two general tendencies can be observed. One is that the ideological 
character of the political elite is more pronounced and its self-definition on 
the ideological scale is more polarized23 than that of citizens (Körösényi 
1999: 58-70; Enyedi 2005: 12). Members of the political elite (especially 
representatives) move further from the political centre. The other tendency is 
that the ideological self-definition of the voting blocs of parties follows the 
changes in the dynamics of politics and the party system and the relationships 
between the parties, so the self-placement of citizens on a left-right scale also 
shows a polarizing trend. This is better illustrated by the index of sympathy-
antipathy among the potent voting blocs of parties. Research by Angelusz 
and Tardos (2000: 105-113) which covers the period between 1991 and 1998 
showed that changes in the sympathy-antipathy index can be well explained 
by changes in politics and party relations. To put it another way, the changes 
in political dynamics resulted in changes in citizens’ preferences. The active 
role of parties and the political elite in shaping citizens’ preferences was 
revealed in Hungarian empirical literature by way of Zsolt Enyedi’s (2005) 
case study of Fidesz, which focused precisely on this question.
To summarize, I think, based on the above, that it may be justified to regard 
parties and the political elite as the principal actors of polarization. We would 
also be justified in drawing the conclusion that voters follow the polarization 
which occurs among parties and the elite after a certain lag. This provides 
an answer to the chicken-egg question. Parties and political elites generate 
political division and the political polarization of voters. Polarization which 
23  A similar tendency can be observed on the liberal-conservative scale.
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takes place among elites makes the political-ideological profile of voting 
blocs more pronounced, and this results in increased polarization among 
voting blocs.
tHe eFFects oF Polarization on tHe 
FunctioninG oF democracy
From Schumpeter’s thesis it follows that polarization into two hostile 
camps weakens the advantages of democracy. In the third and last part of my 
article I explore this contention through addressing the following question: 
what effect does the depth of the division of citizens and the political elite and 
the intensity of political polarization have on democratic accountability and 
the effectiveness of democracy?
The promise of democratic elitism has been the reconciliation of elite 
rule and democracy: this refers to a state wherein the elite does rule, but it 
becomes accountable and replaceable. According to the new elite paradigm 
in the thesis of John Higley and his co-authors, the overly deep division of 
the elite weakens the stability of democracy. We saw above that growing 
polarization itself has not undermined political stability, in contrast to Higley 
and his co-authors’ contention that it does. Instead, and this is my hypothesis, 
it weakens the accountability of incumbents.
In the following, I will try to explore the mechanisms through which 
this weakening effect prevails.24 I distinguish five effects that work in this 
direction: psychological and information, moral, public policy, patronage and 
the delegitimizing effect.
the Psychological and information effect
Ideological-political polarization, depicted by Anthony Downs (1957) as a 
U-shaped distribution of citizens’ preferences on a left-right scale, produces 
a “camp-mentality” on the opposing sides of the political-ideological 
spectrum. This situation, often characterized in Hungarian political literature 
and journalism as a “cold civil war”, results in the rise of an “Us vs. 
Them” awareness. Tribal politics and the “camp-mentality” breaches and 
24  Polarization, besides its negative consequences, may have some benefits as well. One such 
effect is that elite polarization leads to increased political participation (Crepaz 1990). Another 
is that the consistency of the average voter’s attitude-ensemble increases (Levendusky 2010).
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weakens independent (of party-political interest) public opinion25, and has a 
disinformational effect. What explains this?
It is an old observation that people talk more willingly –  about politics 
as well as other subjects –  with others who have the same views, than with 
those who have different ones (Berelson 1952: 323). The segmentation of 
political communication leads to a splintering of public opinion. Political 
homophilia and the formation of a camp-mentality has a negative effect on 
citizens’ information levels and also on the likelihood that the information 
they receive is “balanced”. Growth in political polarization thus increases 
the chasm between the “political reality-perceptions” of groups with different 
political outloooks. The stronger the camp-mentality, the more biased 
citizens’ information and the less objective their picture of “political reality” 
becomes.26 One of the reasons for this is confirmation bias; a preference for 
information that corresponds to our pre-existing hypotheses and beliefs rather 
than for information which contradicts it (Plous 1993: 233). Those with strong 
political views are more willing to listen to news that confirms their political 
beliefs and the analyses of their own party leaders, while  –  through selective 
perception  –  suppressing and filtering out uncomfortable information (Plous 
1993: 15-21). This is reflected in media consumption habits. Most people read, 
listen to, or watch media products that conform to their political beliefs.27 The 
selection and framing of issues is performed by a partisan media, which, in 
turn, affects consumers’/citizens’ political opinions, reinforcing the filtering 
effect. According to some studies the need for profitability of the commercial 
media also plays into this effect (Bernhardt et al. 2008). So, the growing 
polarization of society increases the partiality of the media, which  –  as an 
independent factor  –  has a negative effect on the information level of media 
consumers and citizens, making them even less objective.
25  “If ... attitudinal positions expressed on a scale shift extremely from a normal distribution, 
this signals that the chances of convergent communication, attuned to one another ... severely 
decrease, and, in fact, the somewhat unified semantic universe, which is a precondition of 
democratic communication, evaporates” (Angelusz-Tardos 2011: 357).
26  This can be observed with so-called adverse media bias. According to social-psychology 
experiments, selective perception often leads to media consumers from the other end of the 
political spectrum with strong party loyalty regarding the same media products as being 
biased against their own party (Plous 1993: 20).
27  One reason for this is that, although having better-informed citizens would benefit every voter, 
individual citizens, because of their negligible influence on the outcome of the elections, are 
not interested in gaining a higher level of information (the thesis of rational disinformation). 
Individual citizens thus appreciate the entertainment value of media more than its news or 
information value (Bernhardt et al. 2008).
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Media consumption habits shaped by political polarization and camp-
mentality and media bias decrease the efficiency of voters’ decisions; that 
is, through the “disinformation” mechanism, they distort election results. By 
“distortion” I mean that, given a specific (polarized) preference-distribution 
or camp-mentality, the selective perception of political reality and media 
bias lead to different types of voter behaviour than would be the case if both 
camps got their information from the same “neutral”, objective media. With 
are ent from how they would be if The growth in polarization means not only 
that the distance between the political values and goals of the political camps 
increase, but also that there will be a chasm between their information about 
a given situation and their picture of political reality (such as the processes 
leading up to it and the underlying causal connections). In Hungary several 
studies have shown that there is a correlation between media consumption 
habits and political preferences (see e.g. Gazsó 2005).
The Moral Effect
Due to ideological-political polarization and the camp-mentality, the role 
of camp membership and (party)political loyalty  –  in place of professional 
competence and aptitude, as well as moral integrity  –  increase to an extent 
that might be considered pathological. A double standard becomes operative, 
where violating basic norms is acceptable on ‘Our’ side, while being 
unforgivable on the ‘Other’. The disappearance of a common standard leads 
to moral relativism and gives rise to political irresponsibility and corruption. 
All this reduces the efficiency of democratic control and accountability as 
the incentivising effect of democratic elections on incumbents, as depicted 
in Friedrich’s rule, weakens.28 With a more polarized political spectrum the 
role of partisan voters increases, while the proportion of swing voters is 
reduced. When a government can count on the votes of its own camp in all 
circumstances, the number of swing voters is down to a minimum and the 
fight for the voters of the other camp is hopeless, what incentive does the 
governing party have to keep its election promises? What would motivate 
it to govern efficiently and responsibly, in tune with the public interest? 
Democratic control and the  accountability of politicians is only effective if 
28  A further psychological effect of political polarization is that in place of rational/deliberating 
voters, expressive voters with strong political loyalties are created. Thus voting for the 
candidate on the other side becomes meaningless or “irrational”, even if the incumbent on the 
favoured side performs abysmally (is corrupt, etc.).
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a significant portion of voters do not belong to either political camp. But 
for the undecideds, as their votes depend on situative factors, evaluation of 
government performance means a lot.
In a polarized situation a significant number of undecided/median voters 
motivates parties to manipulate the beliefs of swing voters about possible 
policy choices and their consequences. Using policy-distortion or heresthetics 
they try to paint reality and the causal relations of the world of public policy 
(that is, the actual situation and the connections between specific policy inputs 
and outputs) in a way that the presumed implications of intended or pursued 
government policies correspond to the outcomes preferred by undecided/
median voters (Hindmoor 2004;  Schultz 2008: 1079). The stronger the 
polarization and the further the parties are from the median position, the more 
dependent swing voters’ actual party choices are on the success of the given 
party’s efforts at policy-distortion and heresthetics.
I believe these developments occured to a great extent in Hungary after the 
turn of the millennium. Even if a U-shaped distribution of preferences did 
not materialize, the curve depicting the distribution flattened. The extremes 
grew and camp mentality took hold. Political parties entered territories – the 
middle and lower levels of public administration, universities, health-care 
institutions  –  they had not been present in during the 1990s. They spread 
their influence – by leadership appointments and other means – into areas 
such as theatres and cultural institutions. Signs appeared of the operation of a 
double standard and the spread of moral relativism as a consequence of tribal 
politics (such as the appearance of groups of intellectuals who influenced 
public opinion; who were organized on the basis of political sympathy; that 
stood by and demanded freedom from punishment for politicians and public 
personalities who were charged with common criminal offenses).
 the Public Policy effect
If the incumbent party makes good that its policies are always in accord 
with its election promises, public policy – in the case of a state of growing 
polarization – starts “zig-zagging” over successive government cycles . 
This, according to my hypothesis, reduces the efficiency of public policy in 
several ways. First, due to the effect of polarization, public policy diverges 
from the median position that represents the social optimum (Schultz 1996; 
2008). This is because the incumbent party will not pursue a centrist public 
policy – will not adjust to the median position – as its own voters would not 
identify with it, and the number of centrist voters has decreased. Second, the 
23POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
CORVINUS JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL POLICY  2 (2013) 
frequent change of direction reduces the efficiency of public policy, also in 
the sense that frequent changes of direction or regime in public policy create 
great social costs. The costs of the introduction of a new direction of public 
policy have to be paid for, while, because of the short life-span of the public 
policy regime – changing with each goverment cycle – its benefits often fail 
to materialize. Affected areas of public policy in Hungary in the previous two 
decades include, for example, public and higher education, health-care, social 
and income policy, drug and criminal policy.
In systems of government based on a division of power, a further public 
policy effect of polarization might be that deadlocks leading to indecision 
become more common, while public policy renewals (reforms) get 
sidetracked (McCarty n.d.). As, in a system based on the division of power, 
successful public policy decisions require wide consensus  –  or at least the 
neutralization of veto points  –, polarization increases the motivation of 
the opposing side to block government policy in every possible way. In the 
Hungarian governmental system one effective instrument of public policy 
veto was the activation of the mechanism of judicial review. In the 1990s, 
as a consequence of laws requiring a two-thirds majority and the lack of 
consensus due to political polarization, the role of the Constitutional Court 
(rather than Parliament) increased in interpreting the Constitution, and through 
that, in constitution- and lawmaking. Another possible veto-instrument was 
referendum by popular initiative (one spectacular example of its successful 
use occurred in 2008).
Finally, stronger polarization offers more incentive to create strategic 
disagreement and practice shifting responsibility (the blame game), which in 
turn has a negative effect on the political bargaining process (McCarty n.d., 6). 
From the recent record of Hungarian politics a good example is the formation 
of the new Constitution in 2010-11. As the opposition couldn’t block Fidesz’s 
two-thirds majority from creating a new Constitution it decided to withdraw 
from the constitution-making process. This boycott-strategy questioned the 
legitimacy of the whole process, as the charge of “one-sided” constitution-
making seemed more effective at discrediting the new Constitution. The 
withdrawal of the opposition  –   at least in the short run –  caused only minor 
trouble for Fidesz as it justified the creation of the new Constitution in the 
first place by the need to break with the previous two decades, which was re-
confirmed by the withdrawal of the opposition. However, in the mid and the 
long term this might weaken, or even completely undermine the legitimacy of 
the new Constitution (Jakab 2010).
To summarize, political polarization in Hungary (A) in the area of 
traditional goverment policies  –  where the classic majority rule of decision-
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making applies  –  reduces the efficiency of public policy by making it “zig-
zag”, while (B) in areas of public policy covered by the division of powers it 
has a “conservative”, status quo-maintaining effect, and (C) in several other 
areas it leads to strategic disagreement. As a consequence of these effects, the 
efficiency and ability to renew of the affected public policies might weaken.
the Patronage effect
The growth in polarization has affected appointment policy in filling 
positions in public administration, government, state and public institutions. 
Because of the growing inability to reach a consensus, filling positions that 
require parliamentary nomination and/or approval has become more and 
more problematic. The time needed to fill these positions, as well as the 
number of positions left unfilled has increased. In the United States, for 
example, this has been true in the case of federal judges. In Hungary these 
positions included Constitutional Court justices, parliamentary comissioners, 
the president and vice-president of the National Audit Bureau and the chief 
justice of the Supreme Court. Polarization has also affected the quality of 
the personnel who have filled these positions. Rather than persons who are 
outstanding in their field but have stronger characters  –  and who are sure to 
be vetoed by one of the parties  –  the proportion of mediocre candidates has 
grown in the affected bodies.
the delegitimizing effect
In the model of the median voter, as the outcome of the elections does not 
cause dramatic changes in government policy and the side that has lost the 
election can reasonably expect to have a good chance of winning the next 
time, the stakes of the political competition, or game are relatively low. The 
winner does not seek to eliminate or criminalize its opponents. Because of the 
low stakes, the chance of winning and the force of the underlying consensus 
both political camps expect the rules of the game to remain unchanged and 
expect the other side to keep to them.
In the case of elite division and political polarization, the situation changes. 
The stakes of politics rise. First, the stake represented by the elections rises 
in the area of public policy, because  –  as we could see in the Hungarian 
examples above  –  a change of government may result in radically different, 
even completely opposing public policy.
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Second, besides public policy, politics is going to have a constitutional 
stake as well. The reason for this is that the lack of an underlying consensus 
might mean differing constitutional aspirations; that is, an intention to change 
the rules of the game (more precisely, this shows that the game metaphor is 
inadequate for depicting politics, since in a game rules are exogenous to the 
players, while in politics the rules are made by the political actors who are the 
players themselves). An opportunity to change the rules in Hungary requires 
a two-thirds majority in Parliament. In the past two decades two governments 
(the Horn government in the 1990s, and the second Orbán government after 
2010) have had this opportunity. The Horn government in 1994 modified the 
Constitution, while the second Orbán government adopted a new Constitution.
Third, the weakening of the boundary between political and legal 
responsibility might reduce politicians’ immunity from legal accountability. 
Western democracies give legal immunity to representatives and other 
leading public officials for the time of their mandate  ensuring that their 
political activity is protected from criminal or other official sanctions or 
other arbitrary procedures. The possibility or practice of the suspension of 
immunity, or the criminal accountability of politicians who have left their 
office raises the stakes of politics. Stigmatization of political opponents and 
the criminalization of politics are possible effects of political polarization. 
In Hungary, criminal procedures against politicians have been part of party 
political struggles since the 1990s. With members of the elite who had 
been charged or been under investigation, pro and contra arguments often 
followed political camp divisions. Investigations and criminal procedures 
against members and officials of the previous government (after it lost the 
elections and left office) and the leaders of state companies were initiated by 
the new, opposing government and appeared at a massive scale after the turn 
of the millennium. Since in the Hungarian justice system the prosecutor’s 
office did not belong to the minister of justice but was independent, incoming 
governments set up special “supervisory offices”  –  which carried out 
examinations and conducted investigations  –  for the purpose of starting 
procedures against officials of the previous government.
Polarization increases the stakes of getting into government. In the median 
voter model the stakes are low, as  –  since the rules do not change  –  there is 
always a chance of winning and getting into government. If not now, then at 
the next election. With a polarized political spectrum the stakes of losing the 
governing position increase, which motivates the incumbent party to stabilize 
its position by institutional means, changing the rules to its advantage. 
The textbook example of this is changing electoral laws, or the practice of 
“gerrymandering” as it is known in American politics. In Hungarian politics 
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good examples of this are the modification of the local election law in 1994 
and 2010 by the governing majority, or the modification of the parliamentary 
election system before 1994, and its comprehensive reform, begun in 2011, 
and, in many respects, the new Constitution in 2012.
In the third part of my article I described how political polarization weakens 
the responsivity and accountability of governments through psychological 
and information, moral, public policy, patronage and delegitimizing effects. 
As a consequence of this, political leaders can pursue more independent  –  or, 
if you like, arbitrary – policies.
summary
Finally, I will summarize the three theses of my essay. First, I think I have 
succeeded in proving the polarization thesis, according to which between 
1990-2010 political polarization increased to a large extent in the Hungarian 
political elite and among citizens, although it has not undermined the 
stability of the political system. Second, I gave an endogenous explanation 
for the phenomenon of polarization. The political-ideological profiles of 
the voting blocs and the strengthening of polarization between them have 
been consequences of polarization in the party strategies and among the 
elite, and they have become more pronounced because of them. Third, by 
theoretical discussion and empirical examples taken from Hungarian politics, 
I demonstrated that although growing polarization has not generated regime 
instability, it reduces, or might reduce  –  according to the Schumpeterian 
thesis  –  the efficiency of the operation of democracy. I presented five 
mechanisms of the effects of ideological polarization which weaken 
democratic accountability.
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